报告人：戴民教授（新加坡国立大学）题目：Optimal Consumption and Investment with Asymmetric Long- term/Short-term Capital Gains Taxes时间：2012年12月7日，星期五下午2：00—3：00地点：数学系致远楼10

报告人：王卿文教授（上海大学）题目： Some new developments of matrix equations时间：2012年11月30日，星期五下午4：00—5：00地点：数学系致远楼10

Gene-gene interaction has gained increasing attention in studies of complex diseases. Its presence as an ubiquitous component of genetic architecture of common human diseases has been contemplated. However, the detection of gene-gene interaction is difficult due to combinatorial explosion. We present a novel feature selection method incorporating variable interaction. Several gene expression datasets are analyzed to illustrate our method, although it can also be applied to other types of high-dimensional data. The quality of variables selected is evaluated in two ways: first by classification error rates, then by functional relevance assessed using biological knowledge. We show that the classification error rates can be significantly reduced by considering interactions. Secondly, a sizable portion of genes identified by our classification rule for breast caner metastasis overlaps with those reported in the literature as disease associated

报告题目：Sphere Theorem via Geometric Flow报告时间：2012年11月15日（周四）上午10:00-11:00报告地点：致远楼107

题目： Dynamic Default Predictions - Spot and Forward Intensity Approaches报告人： Professor Jin-Chuan Duan（段锦泉）新加坡国立大学风险管理研究所，所长新加坡国立大学商学院，和发金融讲座教授台湾中央研究院，院士时间： 10月31日(周三)上午 10：00-11：00地点：致远楼107

题目：Incompressible Fluid Flows With Slip boundary conditions报告人：郭本瑜 教授上海师范大学数学系时间：2012年10月25日（星期四）下午3：30地点：数学系致远楼10

The classic Forelli theorem says that if a complex-valued function defined on the unit ball is smooth at the origin and holomorphic along the radial complex lines, then it is holomorphic on the ball. This theorem proved in 1978 has been generalized only in 2006 by Chirka in complex dimension 2. I will discuss the further studies by Kim-Poletsky-Schmalz (JGA2008) and by Joo-Kim-Schmalz (Math Ann 2012).

We study strong stability of Nash equilibria in the load balancing game of m (m ≥2) identical servers, in which every job chooses one of the m servers and each jobwishes to minimize its cost, given by the workload of the server it chooses. A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a strategy profile that is resilient to unilateral deviations. Finding an NE in such a game is simple. However, NE-configurations are not stable against coordinated deviations of several jobs, while a strong Nash equilibrium (SE) is. We study how well an NE approximates an SE. Given any job assignment in the load balancing game, the improvement ratio (IR)of a deviation of a job is defined as the ratio between the pre- and post-deviationcosts. An NE is said to be ρ-approximate SE (ρ≥ 1) if there is no coalition of jobs such that each job of the coalition will have an IR more than ρ from coordinated deviations of the coalition